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Development of linkages with the external environment, e.g. interlocks, is a mechanism to access
scarce resources. Creating and maintaining these linkages may be an organizational capability
that creates a competitive advantage for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). A partial
model of networking strategy is proposed, which includes measures of board composition,
interlocks, entrepreneurial orientation and environmental hostility. Analysis of 70 community
bank Chief Executive OÝ cer (CEO) responses (58% response rate) lends support to the pro-
position that ® rms with a networking strategy performed better (higher return on assets (ROA)
and higher return on expenditure (ROE)) than those ® rms that did not actively pursue the
development of networks.
Keywords: network; strategy; SMEs; board.
1. Introduction
Resource dependency theory proposes that a ® rm’ s continued existence is dependent
on its ability to access and control environmental resources (Selznick 1949, PfeÚ er and
Salancik 1978). Entrepreneurship research suggests that new ventures seek out
resources in order to lower costs, access new knowledge or develop capabilities
(George et al. 2001). Permanent co-operation within networks is a way of developing
advantages of specialization while at the same time reducing the cost of co-ordinating
exchange (Borch and Huse 1993). Research on larger organizations has extensively
addressed interlocking among boards as a mechanism to access scarce resources (Burt
1980, Mizruchi and Stearns 1988, Zajac 1988). Most of these studies focus on board
size, number of interlocks, board composition and competitor ties as predictors of
® nancial performance (Boyd 1990). Development of organizational networks has
been suggested as an organizational strategy with performance implications (Gulati
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1998, Hillman et al. 2000). Although these studies highlight the performance implica-
tions of formal network ties, they do not explicitly state that a board actively seeking
to develop its networks (formal and informal) could improve performance.
Research on the social networks suggests that strong network ties enhance perform-
ance. Social networks are important tools for entrepreneurs in setting up (Birley 1985,
Starr and Macmillan 1990) and developing the business (Hansen 1995). The role of
social network ties has been viewed as critical to entrepreneurship in helping to gen-
erate trust and social capital within the network (Zahra et al. 1999). By generating
trust, entrepreneurs and members within a network have lower transaction costs
(Williamson 1975) and can obtain products or services at below market prices in
subsequent interactions (Gulati 1998). Although the importance of entrepreneurs ’
social networks has been studied, the role of their boards in helping them to develop
their business by actively using their network membership has not been systematically
addressed.
Research on the board of directors highlights the importance of an active board for
® rm performance (Dalton et al. 1999). In a meta-analysis, Dalton and colleagues
found systematic evidence of a positive performance implication of corporate boards.
Similarly, other research points to the conclusion that international experience and
characteristics of the board in¯ uence decision-making and ® rm strategy (Carpenter
and Frederickson 2001, Carpenter et al. 2001). Also, more focused work on social
networks suggests that ties between board members in¯ uence the degree of interaction
and counselling between the CEO and outside directors (Westphal 1999). Hillman
et al. (2000) note that the board’ s connection to the external environment is important
and that ® rms respond to changing environmental conditions by changing the board
composition. To date, research provides a clear indication of the positive in¯ uence of
board composition and characteristics for ® rm performance. However, past research
tends to be silent on the diÚ erential roles played by formal and informal social ties.
Also, most empirical work addresses larger established organizations rather than
SMEs, which are the focus of this study.
This study contends that a ® rm’ s networking strategy is a ` concerted eÚ ort’ to
develop relationships or ties with the ® rm’ s environment to gain access to or control
scarce resources that have long-term pro® tability implications for the ® rm.
Developing network ties is a socially complex routine (Collis 1994) and can be classi-
® ed as a strategic asset (Amit and Schoemaker 1993) that may lead to a sustainable
competitive advantage. McEvily and Zaheer (1999) found that ® rms in geographical
clusters which maintain networks rich in bridging ties can have access to new infor-
mation, ideas and opportunities. Networking strategy, therefore, is a competence-
enhancing organizational capability that helps the ® rm to achieve its goals.
The primary focus of this study is to explore organizational performance implica-
tions of a networking strategy in SMEs. In SMEs, a board member plays an active
role in business development and growth. Therefore, small business board members
are likely to use their network ties to build the business. Borch and Huse (1993)
suggest that it is hard to involve large boards in the business of the company, and
they will serve mainly for control purposes. In contrast, boards in small ® rms can be
proactive and are not necessarily restrained in their contributions or the scope of their
involvement. Developing networks with the environment could be used as a board-
level strategy in small enterprises to improve ® rm performance by gaining control of
scarce resources. Firms that actively encourage networking should outperform those
that do not actively pursue a networking strategy. This study builds on existing
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literature by (1) including a board’ s social network ties as a predictor of performance,
(2) building upon strategic management literature on board interlocks and their
performance eÚ ects, and (3) extending the implications of an active networking strat-
egy into the context of entrepreneurship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the authors develop
theoretical arguments and build hypotheses to suggest the antecedents and bene® ts
of a networking strategy. In section 3 the method adopted for data collection and
analysis is explained. Finally, the results and their implications for SMEs are discussed
in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
In the resource-based view, competitive advantage is created and sustained due to
` distinct competencies’ that facilitate a ® rm to deploy a value-creating strategy that
cannot be perfectly imitated by its rivals (Barney 1986, 1991). A network is de® ned as
a set of long-term contacts between people or organizations in order to get information
and building resources (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). A network is a made up of people
tied together by work, friendship, in¯ uence or communication relations (Knoke and
Kulinski 1982). A network could be either formal (prescribed) or informal (emergent).
A prescribed or formal network is composed of a set of formally speci® ed relationships
whereas an informal or emergent network involves more discretionary patterns of
interaction where the content of relationships may be work-related, social, or a com-
bination of both (Ibarra 1993). A board’ s formal networks have received a lot of
attention (PfeÚ er 1972, Burt 1980, Mizruchi and Stearns 1988, Zajac 1988, Lang
and Lockhart 1990) while their informal/social networks have not been adequately
tested (Johnson et al. 1996). Few studies speci® cally address the importance of infor-
mal and social networks. For example, Borch and Huse (1993) highlight the import-
ance of such networks in Norway and Sweden.
Only recently has the role of networks been viewed within a strategic context
(Ostgaard and Birley 1994, Gulati 1998) but empirical evidence linking networking
strategy to ® nancial performance in small businesses is still being developed. Dalton et
al. (1999) found a systematic relationship between board size and the ® nancial per-
formance of the organization. In biotechnology ventures, Finkle (1998) found a rela-
tionship between the background of the board members and ® nancial performance.
Research on boards of directors includes: (1) the use of boards to secure resources,
increase prestige and achieve legitimacy (PfeÚ er 1972, Pearce and Zahra 1992); (2)
eÚ ects of board constitution on governance decisions and mechanisms (Rediker and
Seth 1995); (3) compensation issues (Zajac 1990); and (4) board structure and stra-
tegic functions (Pearce and Zahra 1991, Goodstein et al. 1994). The strategic role of
the board, beyond acquiring resources or representing stakeholder interests, involves
making important decisions that help the organization to adapt to environmental
changes (Mintzberg 1983, Pearce and Zahra 1991).
In Bavly’ s (1986) study, bank CEOs reported that most corporate boards did not
contribute to the strategic success of their ® rms, and less than 2% of these executives
viewed their board as critical to the success of the ® rm. Recently, however, there has
been a resurgence of interest in board control and involvement in strategic decisions
(Goodstein et al. 1994, Pearce 1995, Rediker and Seth 1995). Board activities could
include securing new customers, developing relations with existing customers, collect-
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ing competitive information, solving non-routine problems or challenges, and repre-
senting the ® rm’ s interests on other boards. Boards that have strong external network
ties with other boards and other organizations increase their chance of receiving new
information and gaining new insights to help to solve non-routine challenges. Board
members with well-developed networks have information that may augment their
skills and competence to ful® ll their strategic function. Apart from information access,
board members may develop contacts that mature into new customers or new sup-
pliers. The importance of a board’ s activities to the success of the ® rm will then be a
function of its networking strategy.
Research on board composition focused primarily on the distinction between inside
and outside directors ( Johnson et al. 1996) where outside directors were classi® ed as
non-management members of the board (Rosenstein et al. 1993). Outside directors
who bring in new resources or diversity of perspectives often are appointed to the
board when existing organizational resources dwindle (PfeÚ er and Salancik 1978,
Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993). The number of outside directors also represents
the amount of control that the board has over the CEO (Zahra and Pearce 1989,
Pearce and Zahra 1992). Board size then signi® es both the resource dependence role
as well as control over strategic decisions (Pennings 1980, Pearce and Zahra 1992,
Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993, Ocasio 1994).
Research investigating the relationship between board independence and ® nancial
performance has suggested that independent boards (higher proportion of outside
directors) will improve performance ( Johnson et al. 1996). The general notion is
that ® rms with well-networked boards, i.e. having greater number of interlocks and
a higher proportion of outsiders, will have superior economic performance. Also, the
service role of directors, i.e. providing advice and counsel to the CEO (Lorsch and
MacIver 1989), may impact ® rm performance especially in smaller entrepreneurial
® rms (Daily and Dalton 1992). An active networking strategy entails an increased
board involvement and a greater number of interlocks.
In small and medium-sized enterprises the importance of boards is further
enhanced. Board members are important sources of knowledge drawn from the col-
lective experience of their members. The authors posit that a networking strategy
among the board of these enterprises is likely to bene® t the ® rm. Therefore, based
on the above arguments it is postulated that:
Hypothesis 1: A board’ s networking strategy will be positively related to ® nancial
performance of the small and medium-sized enterprise.
Studies have taken into account the eÚ ect of the ® rm’ s environment on board
characteristics and interlocks (PfeÚ er and Salancik 1978, Mizruchi and Stearns
1988, Boyd 1990, Lang and Lockhart 1990). Increased competition, regulation and
social forces including demographic changes and trends will cause ® rms to forge
linkages to the external environment. Boyd (1990) found that boards tended to be
smaller in uncertain environments, while having an increased number of interlocks.
Firms are likely to then pursue an active networking strategy as environmental hosti-
lity increases. Few studies address the importance of networks in hostile environments.
For example, Johannisson and Monsted (1997) underscore the importance of a rich
social network in a hostile environment. The above logic suggests that as environ-
mental hostility increases, entrepreneurs are likely to develop resourceful personal
networks to enhance the likelihood of ® rm survival. Similarly, Hillman et al. (2000)
suggest that ® rms change their board composition as environmental uncertainty
272 G. GEORGE ET AL.
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changes, allowing such ® rms to adapt to the changing needs of various stakeholders as
well. Extending this argument to the boards of small and medium-sized ® rms, we
would expect that ® rms in a hostile environment are likely to develop and encourage
strong formal and informal networks among its board members in order to access
resources in a resource-scarce environment. Therefore, it is postulated that:
Hypothesis 2: A board’ s networking strategy will be positively related to environmental
hostility.
Networking, both formal and informal, plays an important role in the entrepre-
neurial process of setting up a business (Birley 1985, Starr and Macmillan 1990,
Hansen 1995) and the quality and content of entrepreneurial networks diÚ er accord-
ing to each ® rm’ s competitive strategy (Ostgaard and Birley 1994). Entrepreneurial
® rms can gain a competitive edge by means of closely integrated networking arrange-
ments with strategic customers and suppliers (Larson 1990). Studies have primarily
de® ned the ` networking propensity ’ of managers and entrepreneurs as participation in
professional and service organizations (Ostgaard and Birley 1994, Carroll and Teo
1996). Although the notion that entrepreneurs use their personal networks has been
extensively addressed, the role of the boards in entrepreneurial ® rms has not been
studied.
Entrepreneurial orientation has been suggested as including three main dimensions:
innovativeness , proactiveness and risk taking (Miller 1983, Covin and Slevin 1988).
These three dimensions can be fundamentally associated with the networking strategy.
For instance, networking requires a degree of proactiveness (anticipating a need for
such contacts), calculated risk taking (the payoÚ from such ties versus the cost of such
ties), and innovativeness (new mechanisms of sourcing knowledge or capabilities). It is
expected that small and medium-sized ® rms with an entrepreneurial orientation are
likely to follow an active networking strategy. Therefore, we suggest that boards of
® rms with an entrepreneurial orientation are more likely to follow an active network-
ing strategy.
Hypothesis 3: A ® rm’ s entrepreneurial orientation will be positively related to a board’ s
networking strategy.
3. Method
3.1 Sample
The study was conducted in the banking industry. The banking industry is under-
going rapid change and consolidation in the USA, where large and small banks co-
exist and serve overlapping but relatively distinct markets. The sample population was
community banks rather than larger banks that have holding companies and multi-
level boards, which would confound and complicate data analysis. Previous studies in
the banking industry have generally focused on the larger banks ( James and Hatten
1995, Mehra 1996). However, the present study involves smaller community banks
that have relatively simple board structures and ownership characteristics.
Community banks are small enterprises and, in general, have a single board and
tend to cater for local community customers making it relatively easy to study coali-
tions (Pearce 1995) or, in this case, networking practices.
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All banks operating in the USA must be incorporated and have a designated
board of directors (a minimum of ® ve directors in the Commonwealth of Virginia).
Virginia was selected as a representative population due to the economic diversity
within the state including large cities and small towns. Also the number of banks
within the state was representative of the banks in other states within the country.
Single industry samples, which may restrict generalization, allow researchers to iden-
tify relationships between variables of interest that may be lost due to diÚ erences
between industries (Lynch et al. 1983).
Community banks were selected as the sample for this networking study because
they typically add successful executives and entrepreneurs to their boards of directors
with the expectation that deposits and high quality loans will follow. Individuals
readily accept invitations from bankers because of the prestige of being on a bank’ s
board of directors. Once the board of directors is determined, bankers typically use
board members for such networking tasks as developing relations with existing custo-
mers, representing the bank in the community, and securing new customers, etc.
Therefore, community banks were a natural choice for studying networking by boards
of directors. This research was limited to community banks in the Commonwealth of
Virginia in order to minimize the number of extrinsic variables. Banks in this study
were considered to range in size from ` small’ to ` medium’ enterprises because of their
designation as community banks, a category speci® cally designed for smaller ® nancial
institutions within the Virginia Bankers’ Association. In a recent study, Kolari et al.
(1997) de® ned small banks as ones with total assets of less than $500 million. The US
Small Business Administration de® nes small businesses as having revenues of less than
$20 million (Wheelen and Hunger 2000) and medium-sized enterprises are de® ned in
the stock indexes as having revenues of less that $500 million. The largest bank in this
study had assets of $270 million.
A mail survey was used to obtain information on the board’ s networks and the
perception of utility of such networks. The survey was administered in 1995. The
content of the survey questionnaire was ® nalized after interviews with CEOs, board
members, and executives of the bankers ’ association. The questionnaire was endorsed
by the Virginia Bankers Association and mailed to CEOs of all community banks in
Virginia (a total population of 133). Thirteen of these banks had multiple boards and
local advisory groups and were eliminated from the data analysis, leaving a popula-
tion of 120 banks. Samples for studies on CEOs, boards or top management teams that
require questionnaire responses tend to be small (Zajac 1990, Boyd and Fulk 1996).
However, 73 (61%) of the surveyed CEOs responded, leaving a usable sample of 70
responses (58%). There was only one mass mailing of the survey due to an informal
agreement with the endorsing agency. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test to measure
sampling adequacy yielded a 0.82 result that can be interpreted as ` meritorious ’
(Kaiser 1974). The Kaiser measure of overall sampling adequacy was examined to
assess the extent to which the indicators of a construct belong together. This measure,
which represents a measure of the homogeneity of variables, should be greater than
0.80.
To ensure that the sample used for analysis was representative of the popula-
tion surveyed, the authors conducted non-response bias tests using simple t-tests
between respondents and non-respondents . Non-response bias tests (t-tests) indicated
no signi® cant diÚ erences at the p < 0:05 level between respondents and non-
respondents when measured by size (assets) and pro® tability (ROA and ROE).
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Performance data were collected for the 5-year period preceding administration of the
survey.
3.2 Measures
Board activities were measured by a seven-item, 7-point scale that was generated by a
series of interviews with bankers based on: (1) the three roles of directors, i.e. control,
service and resource dependence ( Johnson et al. 1996); and (2) transactional content
of social networks, i.e. exchange of relationships, in¯ uence or power, information and
services (Tichy et al. 1979). For seven diÚ erent activities, CEOs were asked to rate the
perceived importance of the board’ s activities from ` extremely important ’ (7) to ` not
important ’ (1). The seven activities were: (1) securing new deposits; (2) securing new
loans; (3) procurement of competitive information; (4) solving non-routine problems;
(5) developing relations with existing customers; (6) representing the bank in profes-
sional organizations; and (7) representing the bank in community organizations .
These seven items were factor analysed (varimax rotation) and two dimensions with
eigenvalues greater than one (Rummel 1970) emerged. The ® rst four items listed
above loaded on the ® rst factor and the last three items loaded on the second factor
(see table 1 for loadings and eigenvalues). Inter-item reliability (Cronbach’ s ) for
items in these two factors were 0.86 and 0.77, respectively.
Networking strategy was measured as the mean score on a four-item, 7-point scale
(appendix A). Items were generated based on: (1) the ® rm’ s ` encouragement ’ of
certain actions, skills, or socially complex routines (Collis 1994); and (2) ` eÚ ective’
use of such routines that are imperfectly imitable (Barney 1991) and causally ambig-
uous (Reed and DeFillippi 1990) to create and sustain a competitive advantage that
would improve long-term ® rm performance. Since ` networking’ is a popular press
term that can be misconstrued to mean unrelated issues (Dean et al. 1997), the survey
de® ned networking as ` the process of developing contacts (with professional and trade
associations, community and local clubs, civic and government bodies) that would
help in the development of the business’ . The four items were factor analysed and
yielded a single dimension (with eigenvalue > 1) which accounted for 65.9% of the
variance (see table 2 for loadings and eigenvalue). The networking strategy scale had
a mean of 4.28, a standard deviation of 1.33, a range of 1 to 7, a response range of 1 to
7, and inter-item reliability (Cronbach’ s ) for the four-item scale was 0.83.
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Table 1. Factor analytic results of board activity importance.
Functional Relational
Securing new deposits 0.80
Securing new loans 0.79
Procurement of market trends and 0.85
competitive information
Solving non-routine bank problems and challenges 0.73
Develop relations with existing customers 0.55
Represent the bank in professional, trade and other organizations 0.87
Represent the bank in various community organizations and functions 0.86
Eigenvalues 4.04 1.07
Variance explained (%) 57.7 15.2 (72.9)
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Interlock was measured as the (1) average number of boards (corporate and civic)
also represented by the board members, and (2) absolute number of boards (corporate
and civic) represented by the outside directors. Board size was the total number of
directors serving as of the ® scal year 1995. Both interlocks and board variables were
included as measures to check construct validity of the networking strategy measure.
Environmental hostility was measured by a three-item, 7-point scale used by Khandwalla
(1977) and by Naman and Slevin (1993: 151). The environmental hostility index has
a mean of 3.02, a standard deviation of 1.02, a range of from 1 to 7, a response range of
from 1.33 to 5.67, with a Cronbach’ s coeÝ cient of 0.71.
Entrepreneurial orientation was measured by a 14-item, 7-point scale (appendix B), of
which nine items are from Naman and Slevin (1993) and ® ve items were generated
from statements in the review by Lumpkin and Dess (1996). Entrepreneurial orienta-
tion is an aggregate measure of ® ve dimensions ± the willingness to take risks, will-
ingness to be proactive, willingness to innovate (Miller 1983, Covin and Slevin 1988),
autonomy, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). The entrepre-
neurial orientation index has a mean of 3.91, a standard deviation of 0.91, a range of
from 1 to 7, a response range of from 1.93 to 6, and a Cronbach’ s coeÝ cient of 0.88.
These psychometric properties fall within the acceptable range and are similar to
those used by Naman and Slevin (1993).
The survey was administered in 1995. Survey measures such as environmental
uncertainty, networking strategy, and board activity importance were collected in
1995. Performance was measured as the 5-year average ROA and average ROE.
That is the performance data pertained to 1991± 1995 and were collected in 1996.
This measure was consistent with other bank-related research samples (Zajac 1990,
James and Hatten 1995). For a control measure, the number of employees for 1995
was used. Data for employees were collected from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Performance and board data were gathered from the Bank Directory of
Virginia, an oÝ cial publication of the Virginia Bankers’ Association and the Thomson
Bank Directory (1996), a publication of 1Thomson Financial Publishing Inc.
4. Results
The banks that participated in this study had an average of $118 million in assets.
Only three of the 70 banks did not make a pro® t, and the 5-year average return on
assets for all the banks was 1.09. All the banks in the study were regulated, but this did
not preclude them from doing poorly or having an outstanding ® nancial performance.
This conclusion is clearly demonstrated by the large standard deviations of 0.64 for
ROA where the mean was 1.09 and the standard deviation of 6.99 for ROE where the
276 G. GEORGE ET AL.
Table 2. Factor analytic results for networking strategy.
Networking is one of the primary activities of the board 0.87
Our bank strongly encourages board members to network 0.67
Our bank eÚ ectively uses the board’ s networks to gain a 0.85
competitive edge over others
We can attribute much of our success to our board’ s strong networks 0.84
Eigenvalue 2.64
Variance explained 65.9%
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mean was 11.28. Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and correlation
matrix for all variables.
The correlation levels between the interlock variables and the networking strategy
variable provide additional construct validity to the networking scale developed in
this study. Although table 3 clearly demonstrates support for the hypotheses (with the
exception of hypothesis 2), a simple linear regression model is used to show predictive
power of each variable. Results of the regressions are presented in table 4.
The relationship between networking strategy and ® nancial performance (hypoth-
esis 1) was supported. Number of employees was used as a control variable.
Networking strategy accounted for a change in adjusted R2 of 0.06 over and above
the control measure for both performance measures ROA and ROE. Table 5 presents
the regression results.
To check individual items in the 4-item networking strategy scale on performance,
t-tests were conducted. The means of those banks that responded with a score of 4 or
lower on the 7-point scale were compared to those with a score higher than 4. Results
of the t-tests are reported in table 6.
Hypothesis 1 was supported. In responding to a question about the emphasis placed
on networking, 31 CEOs indicated that they considered networking to be one of the
primary activities of the board members. The ® nancial performance of those who
considered networking to be a primary activity were higher, with a statistically sig-
ni® cant diÚ erence, for both ROA and ROE. In responding to a question about
whether the bank encourages networking, the response was overwhelmingly positive
with 49 CEOs indicating that they encouraged their board members to network. The
banks where the presidents did not encourage networking had some of the lowest 5-
year average ROAs and ROEs of any of the banks responding to the survey. A total of
24 CEOs indicated that they attempted to use their board members to gain a compe-
titive edge. However, t-tests did not indicate statistically signi® cant superior ® nancial
performance when measured by ROA or ROE. Statistically signi® cant t-tests
… p µ 0:05† indicated that these banks, however, had a higher asset increase ($55.54
million) over the 5-year period compared to those that did not use their boards to gain
a competitive edge ($36.65 million). Finally, in responding to whether the CEOs
could attribute past bank success to their board members, 20 respondents gave credit
to their board’ s networks. These 20 banks had statistically signi® cant superior ® nan-
cial performance when measured by ROE but was not statistically signi® cant with the
ROA measure.
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. Contrary to the hypothesis, a statistically signi® -
cant negative relationship was reported between environmental hostility and network-
ing strategy. The result appears to contradict Boyd’ s (1990) ® nding that muni® cence,
i.e. the abundance of resources in the environment, and interlocks are negatively
correlated. Muni® cence is negatively related to uncertainty and hostility. The study
reports a ± 0.30 … p µ 0:05† and ± 0.23 … p µ 0:10† between average interlocks and total
interlocks, respectively, with environmental hostility (table 3). That is, as environ-
mental hostility decreases, the number of interlocks increases. The authors can only
conjecture that this result may be due to the study being conducted in a period of
relative stability and abundance in the US economy and the banking sector. Another
possible reason could be that SME boards tend to increase the number of interlocks
when their businesses are doing well because of the costs associated with maintaining a
larger and more active board. Boyd’ s (1990) study focused on large ® rms and may
have diÚ erent constraints and consequences than in SMEs.
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Finally, hypothesis 3 was supported at the p µ 0:10 level with an adjusted R2 of
0.03. Therefore, entrepreneurial orientation is signi® cantly related to a networking
strategy. The hypothesis of entrepreneurial orientation, although statistically signi® -
cant at 0.10, only marginally contributes to explaining the variance (3%). It can be
inferred that ® rms with an entrepreneurial orientation are likely to follow an active
networking strategy in their repertoire of strategies.
5. Implications for research on SMEs
The signi® cant ® nding in this study is that formal (interlocks) and informal (social)
networks are critical for SME performance. The results show that boards that actively
develop and use their networks will help the business. Hypothesis 1, which posits a
relationship between networking strategy and performance, was supported. However,
280 G. GEORGE ET AL.
Table 5. Stepwise regression of networking strategy with
performance measures.
Step Variable Average ROA Average ROE
1 Intercept 0.96 0.41 0.97 3.40
Employees 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.14
2 Networking strategy 0.28* 0.29*
F-value 1.42 3.15* 1.96 3.73*
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.08
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.06
n ˆ 70:
p µ 0:05:
Table 6. Four-item response analysis.‡
Means of variables Means of variables
( ® rms with ( ® rms with Levene’ s test
Item Variable scores > 4) scores < 4) F-statistic
Networking as a 5-year average ROA 1.15 1.00 3.61{
primary activity (31, 0.39) (28, 0.86)
5-year average ROE 12.30 10.09 3.93*
(31, 3.54) (28, 9.58)
Bank encourages 5-year average ROA 1.17 0.66 12.81**
networking (49, 0.41) (10, 1.25)
5-year average ROE 12.17 6.75 23.01***
(49, 3.68) (10, 15.01)
Use networks to gain 5-year average ROA 1.07 1.08 1.33
competitive edge (24, 0.46) (35, 0.76)
5-year average ROE 12.28 10.55 0.02
(24, 5.86) (35, 7.84)
Attribute past 5-year average ROA 1.25 0.99 1.43
performance to (20, 0.39) (39, 0.74)
networks 5-year average ROE 13.00 10.40 3.88*
(20, 2.34) (29, 8.48)
‡ Figures in parentheses indicate sample and standard deviation.
Signi® cance at p-values denoted by: { p µ 0:10, * p µ 0:05, ** p µ 0:01, *** p µ 0:001.
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the results on the context in which boards follow a more proactive networking strategy
was somewhat unclear. The ® rms tended to increase their boards when their busi-
nesses were doing well, contrary to Boyd’ s (1990) prediction that boards increase their
size in hostile, but not stable, environments. Entrepreneurial orientation and a net-
working strategy were positively related (hypothesi s 3). Therefore, the implications
are that more entrepreneurial ® rms tend to follow a more proactive networking
strategy.
This research was exploratory in nature. It was our intention to show that network-
ing strategy could have ® nancial performance implications. On a secondary note,
researchers of boards have used various independent variables and multiple operatio-
nalization of dependent variables. This study recognized that ` it may not be too early
to standardize at least some of our (research) equipment’ ( Johnson et al. 1996: 433).
The networking strategy scale oÚ ers a new addition, and a way to substitute, to the
repertoire of measurement tools in board governance, resource dependence and net-
works literature. The scale has signi® cant positive correlations to board measures used
in strategic management literature. The scale exhibits acceptable psychometric prop-
erties with a reliability (Cronbach’ s ) coeÝ cient of 0.83 and has positive performance
correlations.
Surveys requiring CEO participation, especially in large corporations, need to be
concise so as to improve participation rates (Zajac 1990). Researchers involved in
synthesizing research and collecting data on several widely varied constructs could
bene® t from a simple 4-item scale that can substitute for massive data collection
eÚ orts. However, researchers need to keep in mind that this scale has not been tested
across several SIC categories nor has it been tested for temporal stability. The 14-item
entrepreneurial orientation scale, although it exhibits acceptable psychometric prop-
erties, requires additional testing across diÚ erent industry groups and with measures of
performance other than ROA or ROE (Chakarvarthy 1986, Johnson et al. 1996).
Future research may need to validate the scales across industries with additional
performance measures. Researchers should also keep in mind that the CEO survey
was administered in the year subsequent to the year when performance data were
collected. Positive feedback loops may occur with networking strategy, i.e. positive
outcomes on past network connections encourage board members to create new ties.
The temporal aspect of networking, a socially complex routine, is another avenue for
future research.
As the results of the study are based on a single industry it will be diÝ cult to
generalize the results and apply them to other types of organizations without further
investigation. Also, the study suÚ ers from single rater bias. However, since the intent
of the study was exploratory in nature it provides a good foundation on which to build
future work in this area. Future studies can improve by including cross-sectional data
and probing more in-depth the variables related to the board networking strategy.
The results of the study were as theorized, except for hypothesis 2. Limitations aside,
other studies in the area (Borch and Huse 1993, Johannisson and Monsted 1997,
McEvily and Zaheer 1999, Westphal 1999) provide support to our results in the
importance of networks and their role in the success of an organization. Since the
other studies were conducted in a diÚ erent setting their support helps to validate the
results of the study.
Networking strategy is a ` concerted eÚ ort’ . As in a concert, harmony is in the
orchestration of diÚ erent skills. Although this study tests the networking strategy of
board members, developing network ties could be a ® rm-wide strategy, especially in
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knowledge-intensive work. For example, scientists and professionals in universities,
computer, pharmaceutical and biotech industries could greatly bene® t by developing
network ties to increase research funding, bring about innovations, improve existing
technologies, or expand their applications. These actions if internalized within the
® rm will remain heterogeneous and could lead to a competitive advantage.
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Appendix A. Items used to measure perceived importance of
board member networking.
Networking is the process of developing contacts (with professional and trade associa-
tions, community and local clubs, civic and government bodies) who would help in
the development of the business. The following questions relate to networking
practices:
1 Networking is not an 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Networking is one of the primary
important activity of the activities of the board
board
2 Our bank discourages 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Our bank strongly encourages
board members from board members to develop
developing networks networks
3 Our bank does not 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Our bank eÚ ectively uses board
eÚ ectively use board member’ s networks to gain a
member’ s networks to gain competitive edge
a competitive edge
4 We cannot attribute past 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 We can attribute much of our
bank success to our success to our board’ s strong
board’ s strong networks. networks.
Appendix B. Entrepreneuria l orientation questions.
In dealing with competitors, this bank . . .
1 Is not highly responsive 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Typically adopts a head-to-
to competitor ’ s strategies. head confrontational strategy.
2 Typically uses 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Is willing to adopt
conventional methods of unconventional methods of
competing. competing.
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When confronted with decision making under uncertainty, my bank..
3 Discourages the CEO 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Typically encourages the CEO
from acting independently to act independently without
without previously previously consulting the board.
consulting the Board.
4 Discourages CEO from 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Typically encourages the CEO
making key strategic to make key strategic decisions
decisions without previously without previously consulting
consulting the board. the board.
5 Discourages the CEO 1Ð 2Ð 3Ð 4Ð 5Ð 6Ð 7 Typically encourages the CEO
from implementing key to implement key programs
programs without previously without previously consulting
consulting the board. the board.
Items 1± 5 generated from statements in Lumpkin and Dess (1996).
For items 6± 14, see Naman and Slevin (1993).
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